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Abstract
After several public tragedies, corporate missteps, and
catastrophes; politicians, certain investors, and other
stakeholders have called for accountability in capitalism,
proactive action to alleviate climate change, and performance of
social obligations from corporations.

The Business Roundtable

and World Economic Forum have come out with proposals that
signify a paradigm shift to the stakeholder approach to
capitalism.

Delaware, a haven for shareholder primacy, has

permissive standards that allow a corporation to engage in any
lawful business activity.

However, concerns about fiduciary

duties, especially the implied duties of good faith, legal
compliance, and oversight, have created obligations for
directors to engage in oversight and accountability mechanisms
at the board level.

These mechanisms are promising for

stakeholders; by enhancing compliance and awareness about
federal regulation, corporations can better equip directors to
aid corporate stakeholders.

This form of consideration of the

stakeholder is consistent with the duty of care and the duty of
loyalty, especially where they overlap with “mission critical”
operations.

This comment argues that corporate managers’ use of

enhanced oversight of stakeholder and mission critical functions
would be beneficial for both the stockholder and the nonstockholder stakeholder alike.
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I. Introduction
Recently, influential members of the business community
including the Business Roundtable, the World Economic Forum, and
Larry Fink, have pushed for a shift in the stakeholder approach,
departing from years of shareholder primacy.1

These

announcements come from influential organizations and leaders in
the business community and signify a paradigm shift in the
business community.2

1

Over the last thirty years, corporate law

Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose

of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All
Americans’, (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economythat-serves-all-americans; World Economic Forum, The Universal
Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, (Dec.
2, 2019), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davosmanifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-company-in-the-fourthindustrial-revolution/; Larry Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of
Finance, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/larry-fink-ceo-letter, (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).
2

See Erik Gordon, Companies Don’t Need Permission from the

Business Roundtable to be Better Corporate Citizens, PBS NEWSHOUR
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/column-

1

has slowly shifted toward considering social obligations to the
stakeholder through the states’ promulgation of constituency
statutes and benefit corporation statutes. 3

Stakeholders are

groups that are impacted by business, including employees,
customers, suppliers, communities, and the environment. 4

At the

same time, institutional investors increased pressure on
corporations to act upon societal obligations through corporate
social responsibility and investors moved to consider

companies-dont-need-permission-from-the-business-roundtable-tobe-better-corporate-citizens (referring to the Business
Roundtable’s statement as a “symbolic change in tune”).
3

See Dina Dalessandro, The Development of Social Enterprise and

Rise of Benefit Corporations: A Global Solution?, 15 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 294, 298-299 (2019) (explaining past social and legal
developments leading to the existence of the benefit
corporation).
4

See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A

Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 651
(2004) (“[C]orporate officers must give weight to the interests
of other corporate and societal constituencies.”).

2

Environment, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) factors in their
decisions.5
The Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), the nation’s
most influential corporate law, remains dedicated to shareholder
primacy, the prioritization of shareholder profit maximization
over other interests.6

Nevertheless, the business judgment rule

and case law regarding oversight and accountability permit
corporations to consider stakeholder interests.7

5

Under Delaware

See Fink, supra note 1 (stating that BlackRock will

increasingly vote against boards that do not make sufficient
sustainability disclosures and the underlying business
practices).
6

See Leo E. Strine, The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-

Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure
Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 761, 766 (2015) (arguing that the structure of the
DGCL and case law that ground Delaware in shareholder primacy).
7

See Betty M. Huber, Joseph A. Hall, and Louis Goldberg, Legal

Implications of the Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate
Purpose, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM

ON

CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Aug. 21, 2019),

https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/column-companies-dont-needpermission-from-the-business-roundtable-to-be-better-corporate-

3

law, directors have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, as
well as implied duties of oversight and good faith.8

These

duties require corporate directors to act with reasonable care
to implement and monitor essential or “mission critical”
functions of the corporation through oversight systems,
including ensuring compliance with federal and local
regulations.9

Since the Business Roundtable identifies

stakeholders as fundamental to business, fiduciary duties of
oversight, good faith, and legal obedience extend to stakeholder
interests.

Through monitoring and reporting systems,

corporations can ensure regulatory compliance while shedding

citizens, (claiming the business judgment rule should protect
directors when they engage in good faith actions).
8

See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d

362, 367 (Del. 2006) (discussing the duty to act in good faith);
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996) (establishing the duty of oversight).
9

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019)

(discussing the need for board level oversight of “mission
critical” functions of a corporation).

4

light on stakeholder interests by increasing transparency and
information sharing.10
This comment argues that enhanced oversight of mission
critical functions, including stakeholder interests, would
better serve the stakeholder and stockholder alike.

Section II

of this comment explains the basics of Delaware fiduciary law
and the different movements that led to a shift to considering
stakeholders.

Section III analyzes Delaware fiduciary law,

including recent oversight cases, that mandate legal compliance
and oversight from the board of directors regarding “mission
critical” operations.

Section IV recommends certain routes

corporations and governments can take to better accommodate
stakeholder interests into their corporate structures, while
following Delaware law.
II.

Shareholder Primacy vs. Stakeholder Approach:

A False

Dichotomy
A.

Delaware’s Stockholder-Centric Law

Delaware, the corporate capital of the United States, is
the state of incorporation for sixty-six percent of all Fortune

10

See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience,

72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2021 (2014).

5

500 companies.11

Consequently, much of corporate governance is

based on Delaware’s preference for shareholder primacy.12
Delaware is known for its specialized business Court of
Chancery, which resolves corporate disputes before a judge.13
Additionally, Delaware’s business friendly government and tax
code is appealing for corporations.14
Although the DGCL states that a corporation can serve any
lawful purpose,15 corporate fiduciary law prioritizes stockholder
welfare, giving no other stakeholder any legal corporate power
or avenue for oversight, leaving stakeholders to “vote with

11

Why Business Choose Delaware, DELAWARE DIVISION

ON

CORPORATIONS,

https://corplaw.delaware.gov/why-businesses-choosedelaware/(last visited Sep. 2, 2020).
12

Id. Cf. David Million, Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories

of the Corporation, 1990 Duke L. J. 201, 236(explaining how many
scholars favor different theories of corporation, such as nexus
of contracts, which essentially means a corporation is a nexus
of contracts among private individuals).
13

Id. (discussing the benefits of Delaware courts).

14

Id.

15

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 101 (West 2020) (“A corporation may be

incorporated...to conduct or promote any lawful business or
purposes”).

6

their feet.”16

Champions of shareholder primacy often refer to

foundational cases to show that any fiduciary who admits that
she is prioritizing any interest above stockholder wealth
breaches fiduciary duty.17
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,18 a
cornerstone of Delaware fiduciary law, establishes that
stockholders must prioritize maximizing stock price in a
takeover situation.19

The board engaged in defensive strategies

when faced with a hostile takeover offer, including accepting a

16

See Strine, supra note 6 (arguing that Delaware law allocates

legal rights to only stockholders); see also Vote Every Day.
Vote B Corp, Certified B Corporation,
https://bcorporation.net/vote (last visited Feb. 15, 2020)
(discussing the concept of “voting with your feet” to express
approval of a corporation’s practices through patronage).
17

See Strine, supra note 6 at 776-77; see also Revlon, Inc. v.

MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (holding that directors must vote to maximize stock price
in takeover situations); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,
682 (Mich. 1919) (stating that a business corporation is
organized for the profit of stockholders).
18

506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).

19

Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.

7

bid with unfavorable conditions such as a $25 million
cancellation fee, rather than a competing offer that would
maximize stockholder value.20

Revlon’s shareholders prevailed in

a derivative suit for a breach of fiduciary duties.21

The

Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that in the case of a
competing takeover offers, a corporation’s board of directors
must prioritize the maximization of share price over other long
term considerations.22
In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., a Michigan case that
exemplifies shareholder primacy, the court found that a
corporation is organized primarily for the profit of the
stockholder, and directors must exercise discretion to best
maximize profit without considering other interests. 23

A

director violates her fiduciary duties if she acts in her selfinterest, rather than the interest of the corporation and its

20

Id. at 178 (explaining the options Revlon’s board faced).

21

Id. at 185 (holding that Revlon directors breached their duty

of care when considering non-stockholder benefits).
22

Id. (prioritizing shareholders over other considerations).

23

See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682 (discussing the directors’ decision

to divide up dividends among shareholders); see also Strine,
supra note 6 at 774 (discussing Dodge’s significance to
corporate theory).

8

stockholders.24

While the corporation is primarily managed by

directors and employees, stockholders have special rights under
corporate law.25

Stockholders, as owners of a corporation, are

entitled to transfer ownership of stock, meet annually with
directors, inspect the corporation’s books and records, change
bylaws, and sue the corporation for wrongful acts through
derivative suits.26

Nevertheless, no fiduciary duties are owed

to stakeholders directly, and stakeholders have no enumerated
rights at the corporate level.27

24

See id. at 682; see also DEL CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 102 (West

2019).
25

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8.

§141 (West 2019) (describing

directors role in governing the corporation); Strine, supra note
6 at 784 (discussing stockholders rights under Delaware law).
26

See DEL CODE ANN. tit.

8 § 212 (West (explaining the voting

rights of stockholders and annual meeting requirements); DEL CODE
ANN. tit.8 § 327 (West 1998) (explaining the rights of
stockholders to institute derivative suits).
27

See Strine, supra note 6 at 784 (“[U]nder Delaware corporation

law, no constituency other than stockholders is given any
power).

9

B.

The Paradigm Shift toward the Stakeholder Approach

Since Revlon, many jurisdictions have moved away from
shareholder primacy by promulgating constituency statutes.28

As

activism and calls for action on social issues, labor rights,
and climate change have risen, corporations and investors have
increasingly moved to incorporate considerations of
sustainability and long term growth. 29

Corporate groups such as

the Business Roundtable, the World Economic Forum, and
influential firms like BlackRock have ushered in a new period
for capitalism, focused on corporate purpose and impact. 30

28

See generally Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting

Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992)
(discussing the promulgation of constituency statutes over the
late 1980s and 1990s).
28

See id.; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715 (1983).

29

See The Climate Pledge, AMAZON BLOG DAY ONE, (Sept. 19, 2019),

https://blog.aboutamazon.com/sustainability/the-climate-pledge
(pledging to meet the Paris Climate Agreement through innovation
and use of renewable energy).
30

See Fink, supra note 1(discussing a fundamental reshaping of

finance and consideration of ESG factors).

10

i.

Constituency Statutes

In the 1980s and 1990s, jurisdictions enacted statutes
aimed at allowing directors more discretion when making
corporate decisions.31

Over thirty states enacted similar

statutes, the notable exception being Delaware. 32

Constituency

statutes allow directors to consider specific stakeholders, such
as employees, in their decisions.33

Pennsylvania took the lead

when it enacted the first constituency statute in 1938.34

The

statute allows directors to consider “the effects of any action
upon any or all groups affected by such action, including
shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of
the corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other
establishments of the corporation are located”.35
Although litigation regarding the appropriate balance of
interests in jurisdictions that have constituency statutes and
benefit corporation statutes is rare,

courts have upheld board

31

See 15 PA. CON. STAT. ANN., §47-33-4 (1991).

32

See CONN. GEN. STAT § 33-756 (1988); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)

(McKinney Supp. 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. §21-2035(1) (1991).
33

See Orts, supra note 28 (discussing the promulgation of

constituency statutes).
34

See id.; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715 (1983).

35

15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715 (1983).

11

decisions that consider stakeholders under these statutes. 36

For

example, when an Iowa corporation rejected a takeover offer due
to community interest considerations, aimed at protecting the
corporation from bankruptcy, plaintiff stockholders failed to
advance their claim that the board of directors breached their
fiduciary duty.37

Further, when a Pennsylvania corporation’s

board adopted a stock reclassification as a defensive measure
against a hostile tender offer, a court considered the action
proper because the company considered the interests of the
employees, customers, and community over short term shareholder

36

See Kentucky State Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Tr.

Fund v. Myers, No. 4:10-CV-00332, 2010 WL 11483954, at *1 (S.D.
Iowa Sept. 9, 2010; Georgia-Pacific Corp., v.

Great N. Nekoosa

Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31, 33 (D. Maine, 1989) (holding that a
shareholder rights plan that allowed a referendum only after 90
to 120 days was reasonable).
37

Kentucky State Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund,

2010 WL 11483954, at *1 (involving a takeover situation where
the corporation considered stakeholder interests under the Iowa
Constituency Statute).

12

profit.38

Moreover, the District Court of Maine held that Maine

law suggests that while directors consider what is beneficial
for the shareholders and the corporation, they should consider
stakeholder interest, including employees, customers, suppliers,
and the communities where offices are located.39
ii.

The Rise of Benefit Corporations

More recently, a majority of states enacted benefit
corporation statutes, creating a new for-profit corporation that
operates to advance a specific public benefit. 40

These

corporations often specify a public good in their articles of
incorporation, and create fiduciary duties for directors that
involve both stockholder and stakeholder interests.41

Delaware’s

Public Benefit Corporation statute requires that corporate

38

See generally Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F. Supp,

690 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that a corporation could consider
the impact of a tender offer on employees).
39

See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 727 F. Supp. at 33 (citing Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §716 (repealed 2003)).
40

See J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation:

Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
345,350 (2014) (explaining the structure and use of Public
Benefit Corporations to advance Social Enterprise Law).
41

See id.

13

boards balance the pecuniary interests of stockholders, the
interests of those impacted by the corporation, and the
specified public benefit.42

Many states have benefit corporation

statutes that include provisions requiring mandatory disclosure
or public posting of an annual benefit report, mandatory
consideration of certain stakeholders, and use of independent
and accurate methods of evaluating social and environmental
performance.43
Benefit Corporations can also pursue “B Corp” status
through a certification from B Labs. 44

B Labs, a nonprofit,

holds certified corporations to high standards of social and
environmental performance, transparency, and legal compliance. 45
B Corps are required to undergo a Business Impact Assessment,
which is conducted every three years to ensure transparency and
compliance with certification requirements.46

42

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 362 (West 2015).

43

See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 201(a)-(b) (2013).

44

See About B Corporations, B LAB,

https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps (last visited on Sep. 2,
2020).
45

Id. (explaining the requirements for certification).

46

Id.

14

iii. An Era of Accountable Capitalism and Sustainable
Business
Aside from legal changes toward sustainability and social
responsibility, businesses increasingly consider Corporate
Social Responsibility and the impact of Socially Responsible
Investment on firms.47

Acting on perceived societal obligations,

corporations may act to, among other things,

reduce emissions,

commit to enhancing workers’ rights, benefit charities, and
engage in awareness campaigns.48

Investors also look at ESG

factors when making decisions.49

Institutional investors,

including firms like Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street, have
begun to implement consideration of ESG factors into investment

47

Marcia Narine Weldon, Corporate Governance, Compliance, Social

Responsibility, and Enterprise Risk Management in the
Trump/Pence Era, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 275,299 (2017)
(noting that companies consider corporate social enterprise
commitments and public perception).
48

Id. at 284 (noting that ESG matters are often the subject of

shareholder proposals regarding the company’s annual reports).
49

See Max Matthew Schanzenback & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling

Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience (April 16, 2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the
transition from Socially Responsible Investing to ESG).

15

decisions.50

Additionally, some investors demanded that the SEC

require disclosure of ESG factors along with the requisite
pecuniary disclosures.51
Influential leaders in the business community have also
pushed for the stakeholder approach. 52

The Business Roundtable

is a group composed of the nation’s leading Chief Executive
Officers, including JPMorgan Chase CEO, Jamie Dimon; Apple CEO,
Tim Cook; BlackRock CEO, Larry Fink; and Amazon CEO, Jeff
Bezos.53

50

The Business Roundtable previously used its power and

James Mackintosh, Replacing the Wisdom of Crowds with the

Wisdom of Fink, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/replacing-the-wisdom-of-crowdswith-the-wisdom-of-fink-11579429800 (discussing BlackRock’s CEO
Larry Fink’s comments on a push toward ESG investing).
51

Preston Brewer, ANALYSIS: Tracking SEC’s Evolving Approach to

ESG Disclosures, BLOOMBERG L., (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysistracking-secs-evolving-approach-to-esg-disclosures (discussing
the SEC’s gradual acceptance of ESG disclosures in public
company filings).
52

See Business Roundtable, supra note 1; World Economic Forum,

supra note 1, Fink, supra note 1.
53

See Business Roundtable, supra note 1.

16

influence to advocate for specific policy interests, including
the consideration of stakeholders through corporate Constituency
Statutes.54

On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable released

the Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation (the
“Statement”).55

The Statement includes commitments to five

specific types of stakeholders:

customers, suppliers,

employees, the community, and finally, stockholders. 56

The

Statement left many questions unanswered regarding the
implementation of the factors into corporate governance and the
law.57

However, it indicates a larger paradigm shift in the

business community toward management considering non-stockholder
stakeholders in business operations, especially to advance

54

See generally SEC v. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d 1141 (2011)

(suing and prevailing against the SEC for changes to the
Exchange Act for shareholder disclosures).
55

See Business Roundtable, supra note 1.

56

Id.

57

See Matt Thompson, Failure to Mention Tax in Stakeholder Model

Raises Eyebrows, LAW360 (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1190944/failure-to-mention-taxin-stakeholder-model-raises-eyebrows; (noting that the Business
Roundtable Statement does not mention the impact on taxes).

17

social enterprise.58

States have responded to market demands by

considering stakeholder interests such as employee welfare and
the environment before the Business Roundtable’s Statement.59
In January of 2020, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock,
released his annual letter, stating that BlackRock would vote
against companies that did not make adequate disclosures on
sustainability or lacked sustainable practices and programs. 60
Fink linked environmental action with long term growth,
reasoning that “climate risk is investment risk.”61

Given the

influential authority of leaders in industry, investment, and
business, corporations have already begun to respond to the
“fundamental reshaping of finance.”62

58

See Business Roundtable, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not d

efined.; see also Sammy Criscitello, Investors Struggling to Win
Fund Firms’ Support on ESG Proposals, BLOOMBERG L., (Jul. 29,
2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/investorsstruggling-to-win-fund-firms-support-on-esg-proposals.
59

See Dalessandro, supra note 3 (discussing the rise of

constituent statutes and benefit corporation statutes).
60

See Fink, supra note 1.

61

Id.

62

See Delta commits $1 billion to Become First Carbon Neutral

Airline Globally, DELTA NEWS HUB (Feb. 14, 2020),

18

C.

The Corporation and its Stockholders:

Board Duties

Delaware corporations are governed by a board of directors,
charged with the business and day-to-day operations of the
corporation.63

Members of the board of directors owe the

corporation and its stockholders two main fiduciary duties under
Delaware law: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.64

Other

implied duties, such as duties of oversight, good faith, and
legal obedience arise from these duties. 65
Courts presume that directors act in good faith, are
sufficiently informed, and are acting in the best interests of

https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-becarbon-negative-by-2030/ (committing $1 billion to becoming the
first carbon neutral airline over the next ten years); Brad
Smith, Microsoft Will be Carbon Negative by 2030, MICROSOFT, (Jan.
16, 2020),https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoftwill-be-carbon-negative-by-2030/ (announcing plans to go Carbon
Negative by 2030).
63

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8.

§141 (West 2019).

64

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102 (West 2019); In re Caremark

Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
65

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2024 (exploring the evolution of

fiduciary duties to included implied duties of oversight, good
faith, and legal obedience).

19

the corporation.66

The presumption of the business judgement

rule is rebutted if an action violates a fiduciary duty, does
not satisfy a rational business purpose, is grossly negligent,
or was otherwise carried out in bad faith.67

Courts give

deference to corporate boards under this rule.68

For example,

when Time, Inc. entered a transaction with Warner Brothers, it
forewent an offer from Paramount Communications in order to
preserve company culture.69

The court found that Time had a

rational business purpose in choosing Warner Brothers:
preserving the company’s culture and its long-term growth.70

66

See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52

(Del. 2006) (stating that the law presumes that directors are
sufficiently informed and acting in the best interest of the
corporation while making business decisions).
67

Id.

68

eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36 (Del.

Ch. 2010) (“[T]he Court “will not substitute its judgment for
that of the board if the [board's] decision can be ‘attributed
to any rational business purpose.’”).
69

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,

1153 (Del. 1989).
70

Id. at 1153 (discussing how courts do not try to evaluate the

merits of the long-term versus short-term investment goals).

20

i.

Duties of Loyalty and Care

The duty of loyalty requires that directors make decisions
in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.71
The duty of loyalty goes beyond an affirmative duty to protect
the corporation’s interests, but also an obligation to refrain
from activities that would harm the corporation. 72
Under the duty of care, directors are obligated to use the
same amount of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent
person uses in similar circumstances. 73

This usually encompasses

a duty to be fully and sufficiently informed and act with care
when making decisions for the corporation. 74

Corporate boards

71

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 102 (West 2019).

72

See Barnali Choudhary, Serving Two Masters Incorporating

Social Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 631, 657 (2009).
73

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 102 (West 2019);

see also In re

Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,967

(Del.

Ch. 1996) (“[C]ompliance with a director's duty of care can
never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the
content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss”).
74

Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (stating that corporate boards may

not fulfill their obligations without being assured that

21

should make reasonable inquiries before making decisions and act
in good faith.75
ii.

Duty of Oversight

Directors must implement and oversee essential operations
of a corporation under the duty of oversight. 76

In Caremark, a

health services company violated laws that prohibited companies
from paying doctors to refer patients to their services. 77

After

Caremark officers were indicted and Caremark paid around $250
million in penalties, shareholders sued alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty of care.78

The Court of Chancery held that the

directors had a duty to make an effort to ensure monitoring and
reporting systems existed.79

A breach of the duty of oversight

occurs when directors fail to implement any reporting or

reporting and monitoring systems accurately report information
allowing the board to make informed decisions).
75

See Choudhary, supra note 72 at 660.

76

See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (citing Caremark’s

articulation of necessary conditions for director oversight
liability).
77

See Caremark, 689 A.2d at 960.

78

See id.

at 961.

79

See id.

at 970 (discussing the obligation to be informed).
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information systems, or directors consciously failed to monitor
or oversee systems, rendering themselves uninformed of risk.80
Recently, Delaware courts applied the duty of oversight,
regarding health and safety operations. 81

In Marchand v.

Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that a Blue Bell
director should have been appointed to be responsible for
overseeing health and safety regulation compliance after a
Listeria outbreak.82

Blue Bell, an ice cream company, had failed

to implement any systems to monitor compliance with federal and
state food and drug regulations.83

However, Blue Bell did not

have board level oversight and directors ignored signals before

80

See id.

at 971 (explaining the duty of oversight).

81

See e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In

re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2017-0222JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
82

See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (holding that directors who did

not implement board level oversight of the “mission critical”
operation of food safety breached their duty of loyalty); see
also Clovis Oncology, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (holding that
directors who ignored misleading information from managers of
failed clinical trials had breached their fiduciary duty).
83

Marchand, 212 A.3d at 811 (detailing the red flags the CEO

allegedly ignored).
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the Listeria outbreak which resulted in the deaths of three
people, as well as significant losses for stockholders.84

The

court claimed that the board had an obligation to monitor such
“mission critical” and essential functions of Blue Bell. 85

The

Delaware Supreme Court found that a director should have been
charged with overseeing compliance with federal regulation to
avoid such regulatory disasters.86
Further, in the case of Wells Fargo, stockholders filed a
derivative action claiming that officers and directors were
aware of or consciously disregarded that Wells Fargo employees
were illicitly creating millions of deposit and credit card
accounts for their customers without consent. 87

Employees

motivated by increasing pressure to meet company quotas for the
incentive compensation plans created accounts for customers

84

Id. at 814 (explaining that stockholders suffered losses after

a liquidity crisis caused by the Listeria scandal).
85

See id.

at 824 (“[Caremark] does require that a board make a

good faith effort to put in place a reasonable system of
monitoring and reporting about the corporation's central
compliance risks.”).
86

Id. at 823 (discussing the role of a board in oversight).

87

In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig., 282 F.

Supp. 3d 1074, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
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without consent.88

The board’s Audit and Examination Committee

and the CEO ignored letters from employees regarding the rise of
illegal activity and pressure on employees. 89

The court

acknowledged that the “conscious ignorance” of red flags and the
companies tacit endorsement of illegal practices to increase
stock price.90

The Northern District of California, applying

Delaware law after consolidating several suits on federal and
state claims, found that the stockholders had a valid claim for
a breach of the fiduciary duty of oversight.91
In Clovis Oncology, the corporation’s clinical trials for a
new drug failed, losing the corporation an opportunity for

88

Id. at 1085 (discussing the sales targets and employee

incentive plans that lead to fraudulent activity).
89

See id.

at 1082-3 (detailing the signs of fraudulent activity

and scandal at Wells Fargo including complaints regarding gaming
and sales incentives, lawsuits from employees, government
investigations, and a news article).
90

See id.

at 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (discussing how directors

condoned illegal behavior to meet sales targets).
91

See id.

at 1108 (noting that directors had access to relevant

data and should have known of the illegal activity).
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approval from the Food and Drug Administration. 92

Managers of

the clinical study misled directors and managers about the
success of the clinical trials, leading to an investigation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).93

Although

Clovis set up reporting standards and success criteria, through
the clinical trial protocol, “RECIST”, the court found that the
directors should have detected warning signs of the
misinformation and intervened to stop it. 94

Clovis Oncology

failed to follow the standards of RECIST protocol and the board
received reports that success criteria were being calculated
improperly.95

The court found that directors in highly regulated

industries should understand regulatory problems and intervene
to avoid pecuniary and reputational harm. 96

92

In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2017-

0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
93

See id.

at *6.

94

See id.

at *13 (“[T]he careful observer is one whose gaze is

fixed on the company's mission critical regulatory issues”).
95

Id. at *5-*6 (explaining that success criteria were being

calculated based on unconfirmed responses, rather than confirmed
responses per RECIST protocol).
96

See id.

at *15 (“[T]he Board consciously ignored red flags

that revealed a mission critical failure...this failure of
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Stockholders of Boeing filed suit after a series of safety
issues involving the 737 MAX planes which resulted in two plane
crashes and the deaths of over 300 passengers.97

The

stockholders allege that Boeing’s directors ignored red flags
regarding regulatory compliance, inadequate testing, and a lack
of pilot training.98

While litigation is still pending,

Boeing’s missteps demonstrates the importance of oversight to
both the stakeholder and stockholder.99
Caremark claims for a failure to conduct oversight or
monitor systems illustrate several instances where corporations
did not detect or did not act when compliance issues arose.
While the business judgment rule allows directors some

oversight caused monetary and reputational harm to the
Company”).
97

Jef Feely, Boeing Directors Sued Over Missed Warning Signs on

737 MAX 8, Bloomberg (Nov. 18, 2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-18/boeingdirectors-sued-over-missed-warning-signs-on-737-max-8.
98

See id.

99

See id.
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discretion about business decisions, they must engage in
oversight under the duty of care.100
III. Oversight and the Stakeholder
While Delaware’s permissive standards allow corporations to
consider the stakeholder in certain decisions, the purpose of
most Delaware corporations remains to ensure stockholder
profits.101 Meanwhile, jurisdictions like Pennsylvania, have
provisions in place that allow directors to consider the impact
of decisions on stakeholders.102

At the same time, directors in

Delaware have an affirmative duty of oversight and monitoring

100

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2019 (explaining the foundation

of corporate accountability in the duty of care and duty of good
faith).
101

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 101 (West 2020) (stating a

corporation can exist for any lawful business purpose in
Delaware).
102

Compare Strine, supra note 6 at 776-777 (discussing how

Delaware law prioritizes stockholder interests) with 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §1715 (1983) (empowering directors to consider the
interests of employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors
impacted by the corporation).
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risks the corporation faces.103

Acting on the duty of oversight,

directors could act for the benefit of the stakeholder by
engaging in monitoring of stakeholder-facing functions, which
could be classified as mission critical.104
A. Business Judgment and Long-Term Growth
Proponents of shareholder primacy argue that Delaware law
establishes that the corporate purpose in Delaware is to
maximize stockholder profits.105

The DGCL explicitly empowers

stockholders, giving them the right to bring derivative actions,
to vote during director elections or when considering important
transactions, and amend bylaws.106

103

Meanwhile, stakeholders do

See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d

959,967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
104

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019)

(discussing the importance of monitoring mission critical
operations at the board level).
105

See Strine, supra note 6 at 776 (referencing Former

Chancellor Allen’s readings of Dodge v. Ford).
106

See Strine, supra note 6 at 786 (discussing stockholder’s

rights).
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not have any explicit corporate rights outlined within Delaware
law.107
Nevertheless, Delaware’s extremely permissive legal
standard, the business judgment rule, only requires directors to
act for a rational business purpose.108

The business judgment

rule is a presumption that is only rebutted if directors are
grossly negligent, act in bad faith, or breach fiduciary
duties.109

Consequently, directors may still consider the

impacts of business decisions on stakeholders, except for a
Revlon takeover situation, where stockholders must be the
priority.110

107

See id.

Just as the board in Paramount Communications

at 792 (“If we believe that other constituencies

should be given more protection within corporation law itself,
then statutes should be adopted giving them enforceable rights
that they can wield.”).
108

See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52

(Del. 2006) (describing presumptions of good faith, sufficient
information, and best interest applied to directors’ decisions).
109

See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 36

(Del. Ch. 2010).
110

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d

173,182 (Del. 1986) (establishing shareholder primacy in the
case of corporate takeovers).
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considered long-term growth and company culture when deciding
between tender offers, corporations can take proactive measures
to accomplish goals that serve stakeholders and stockholders in
the long-term.111
B.

Duty of Oversight and Risk Management

Under Delaware law, corporate directors must engage in risk
management to serve the stockholder’s interest in profit
maximization and satisfy their fiduciary duty of oversight.112
While, regulations and internal company policy often serve as
defenses for stakeholder interests, they are also essential to
the corporation’s long-term growth.113

111

When directors have

Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,

1152 (Del. 1989) (discussing Time’s rational business purpose in
choosing to merge with Warner Brothers).
112

Martin Lipton et al, Risk Management and the Board of

Directors, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM

ON

CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Mar. 20, 2018)

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/03/20/risk-management-andthe-board-of-directors-5/ (discussing the evolution of risk
management).
113

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019)

(discussing the necessity for compliance with food safety
regulations at an ice cream company); see also In re Walt Disney
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knowingly ignored compliance issues or failed to conduct
oversight, companies have faced pecuniary and reputational harm,
ultimately leading to stockholders bringing derivative suits for
breach of fiduciary duty.114

While Caremark claims are difficult

to allege and most do not survive motion to dismiss due to the
permissiveness of the business judgment rule, recent cases
demonstrate the importance of the duty of oversight. 115
Wells Fargo fostered a culture of noncompliance by imposing
quotas on employees to increase stockholder value, prompting
illegal activity through the creation of fraudulent accounts. 116

Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 67 (clarifying that legal
obedience is implied in fiduciary duties).
114

See e.g., Marchand, 212 A.3d at 805 (regarding FDA violations

that ultimately led to a listeria outbreak); In re Clovis
Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL
4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (regarding misreporting
of FDA compliance, resulting in SEC investigation).
115

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2017 (explaining that the few

cases that have succeeded on Caremark claims have had
“particularized allegations of a complete lack of board
oversight or egregious disobedience”).
116

In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig., 282 F.

Supp. 3d 1074, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (referring to the
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The Audit and Examination Committee and the CEO ignored letters
from employees, several lawsuits, and several other warning
signs before the investigations from the Office of the
Comptroller and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 117

Had

directors recognized the fraudulent activity and the culture
that incentivized it, they could have intervened to mitigate the
harm to consumers and stockholders alike. 118
Blue Bell’s failure to comply with essential food safety
regulations and failure to conduct oversight at the board level
led to a Listeria outbreak.119

Blue Bell’s board did not discuss

essential health and safety operations, and there were no
protocols in place to update directors of food safety
compliance.120

The court held that directors breached their duty

competitive cross-selling strategies aimed to inflate share
price and executive compensation).
117

Id. at 1082 (citing to the many red flags Wells Fargo

directors ignored).
118

Id. at 1109 (discussing the Chief Risk Officer’s knowledge of

the inadequacy of internal feedback and reporting systems).
119

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d at 822 (discussing the

deaths resulting from a Listeria outbreak).
120

See id.

at 822 (discussing the Board’s breach of duty of

oversight).
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to conduct oversight of “mission critical” operations of food
safety.121

Had the board implemented monitoring systems for food

safety, the stockholder and stakeholder would have benefitted as
it could have prevented the Listeria outbreak.122
The Clovis Oncology Board misled stockholders about the
success of their clinical trials for a new drug, leading to an
SEC investigation.123

In a fact-intensive inquiry, the court

acknowledged the existence of oversight and reporting
procedures, but found that directors actively ignored warning
signs that management was inaccurately reporting on the success
of the clinical trials.124

121

See id.

Had directors taken action to stop

at 824 (referring to food safety as essential and

mission critical).
122

See id.

at 805 (“Three people died as a result of the

listeria outbreak.

Less consequentially, but nonetheless

important for this litigation, stockholders also suffered losses
because, after the operational shutdown, Blue Bell suffered a
liquidity crisis that forced it to accept a dilutive private
equity investment.”).
123

In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2017-

0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
124

Id. at *10 (“Plaintiffs have well-pled that the Board ignored

red flags that the Company was violating—perhaps consciously

34

illegal activity and catch the red flags, stakeholders and
stockholders would have greatly benefited.125
More recently, critics of Boeing’s 737 MAX and it’s safety
issues have argued that the aviation company’s cost-cutting
culture and lack of Federal Aviation Administration compliance
resulted in the deaths of 346 passengers. 126

The eventual

grounding of the 737 MAX resulted in a drop in stock price and a

violating—the RECIST protocol and then misleading the market and
regulators regarding Roci's progress through the TIGER-X
trial”).
125

See id.

at 824 (emphasizing that the Blue Bell directors’

failure to set up oversight protocols regarding the most central
health and safety issue would constitute a breach).
126

See Joe Nocera, News Analysis:

Boeing Sacrificed Quality on

the Altar of Shareholder Value, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-17/nocera-boeing
(arguing that Boeing’s focus on stockholders ultimately harmed
the corporation and its stakeholders); see also In re Boeing 737
MAX Pilots Litig., No. 1:19-CV-5008, 2020 WL 247404, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 16, 2020) (regarding the status of pilots as members
of a class for further litigation).
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halt in business operations.127

While Boeing and Clovis Oncology

await derivative litigation, it is clear that missteps regarding
compliance with regulation ultimately impact both stockholders
and stakeholders by reducing stock price and harming
consumers.128
While Blue Bell, Clovis Oncology, and Boeing exist in
highly regulated industries and complied with some regulatory
requirements, they did not implement systems at the board level
to regulate safety.129

Although Wells Fargo’s fraudulent

operations did not directly impact safety, prioritization of

127

Tom Hals & Tracy Rucinski, Lawsuit Against Boeing Seeks to

Hold Board Liable for 737 MAX Problems, REUTERS, (Nov. 18, 2019)
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-lawsuitboard/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-737max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3 (citing a twelve percent drop in
stock price at the time of publishing).
128

See e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 823 (Del.

2019); In re Wells Fargo & Co. S'holder Derivative Litig., 282
F. Supp. 3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
129

See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823 (“But the fact that Blue Bell

nominally complied with FDA regulations does not imply that the
board implemented a system to monitor food safety at the board
level”).
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stock price and incentive-based compensation ultimately hurt
customers, employees, and stockholders.130

When a corporation’s

missteps are tied to compliance issues, the mere existence of an
oversight and compliance program is often insufficient to avoid
liability, especially in heavily regulated industries.131
C.

Corporate Purpose and Mission Critical

To avoid compliance issues with regulators and
stockholders, directors that engage in oversight of essential
operations will more easily avoid liability. 132

130

Where directors

See Wells Fargo, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 1082 (citing to the

Defendant’s complaint) (“The goal of Wells Fargo's high pressure
cross-selling strategy was to show leadership in cross-selling,
and, most importantly drive up the Bank's share price ...
result[ing] in enormous compensation for the Bank's
executives”).
131

See Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823 (explaining that nominal FDA

compliance was not sufficient to avoid liability for the board’s
failure to conduct oversight).
132

See William Savitt, Ryan A. McLeod, & Anitha Reddy, Delaware

Courts of Chancery Again Sustains Oversight Claims, HARV. L. SCH.
FORUM

ON

CORP. GOVERNANCE, (Oct. 5, 2019),

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/05/delaware-court-of-
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have made good faith efforts to implement board oversight of
regulatory compliance and safety, Delaware courts defer to
boards of directors, “even when illegal or harmful company
activities escaped detection”.133

However, directors have a duty

to conduct oversight over compliance risks. 134
While the Delaware Supreme Court did not define “mission
critical” in Marchand v. Barnhill, it used to term in reference
to the food safety of ice cream production.135

Clovis Oncology

takes this language a step further, noting directors should
carefully observe regulatory compliance issues.136

The Clovis

chancery-again-sustains-oversight-claims/ (discussing the
implications of the Clovis Oncology opinion).
133

Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821 (explaining how the business

judgment rule works in the oversight context).
134

See id.

(discussing the director’s discretion in designing

industry-specific approaches to oversight).
135

Id. at 824 (stating that Caremark does require that directors

make a good faith effort to establish a system of monitoring
compliance risk).
136

In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., No. CV 2017-

0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019)
(“[T]he careful observer is one whose gaze is fixed on the
company's mission critical regulatory issues”).
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Oncology Board failed to intervene after observing obvious
warning signs regarding its mission critical operations.137
While Delaware courts may choose to expand on its definition of
“mission critical” in the future, this language only reinforces
that directors must be aware of compliance risks, especially in
relation to essential operations.138
As fiduciaries, directors should make best efforts to be
familiar with the pertinent regulatory environments relevant to
their business operations and to oversee the compliance with
such regulatory environments.139

The Court of Chancery stated

that a corporation is more likely to face oversight liability
for failure to monitor compliance with law, than with liability
based on failure to monitor and avoid risk from day to day
business operations.140

137

Directors should be familiar with

Id. at *13 (identifying clinical trial protocols and FDA

regulations as mission critical).
138

See id.

139

Id. at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (“[A]s fiduciaries,

corporate managers must be informed of, and oversee compliance
with, the regulatory environments in which their businesses
operate.”)
140

In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., 2019 WL 2320842, at *14

(Del. Ch. May 31, 2019) (discussing the Cambridge Analytica data

39

mission critical legal compliance issues, and the regulatory
frameworks that govern them.141

While courts may defer to a

board’s business judgment, the duty of oversight indicates that
legal compliance remains a priority for courts under fiduciary
law.142

Wells Fargo, Marchand v. Barnhill, and Clovis Oncology

are the few cases where Caremark claims have been successful,
likely because the risks impacted both legal compliance and
business goals.143

These cases, along with the rise of advocacy

for stakeholder interests and oversight operations, could lead

breach which led to approximately $ 120 billion in losses of
shareholder wealth.)
141

Clovis Oncology, 2019 WL 4850188, at *13 (describing the

importance of monitoring mission critical operations).
142

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2019; see also In re Walt

Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)
(“[E]xplaining that a failure to act in good faith can be shown
when a fiduciary acts with intent to break the law, advances
interests other than the best interest of the corporation, or
intentionally fails to act).
143

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2036 (referring to the cases as

“[t]he small handful of Caremark cases that have survived this
nearly insuperable standard”).
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to increased accountability and transparency for mission
critical operations.144
Identifying stakeholders or ESG metrics as “mission
critical,” either through a change in law or a corporation’s
governing documents would require enhanced oversight from
directors.145

When environmental impact, for example, is subject

to increased oversight from the board of directors, a
corporation can better ensure compliance with the Environmental
Protection Act.146

Directors can advance the dual intentions of

increased regulatory compliance and increased awareness about

144

See Lipton, supra note 112 (discussing how investors

increasingly consider risk oversight matters); see also, John
Armour, et al, Board Compliance, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1220
(2020) (describing the importance of audit committees and
compliance committees in opening up bandwidth for engagement).
145

Clovis Oncology, 2019 WL 4850188, at *12 (“[W]hen a company

operates in an environment where externally imposed regulations
govern its “mission critical” operations, the board's oversight
function must be more rigorously exercised”).
146

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019)

(discussing the importance of monitoring mission critical and
legal compliance issues for ice cream production).
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stakeholder needs by monitoring risk areas at the board level. 147
Through enhanced oversight, directors may act on their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care, while providing stakeholders the
protections afforded to them through regulation. 148
In fact, corporations and investors have demanded increased
disclosure of risk, especially related to climate change.149
Many stockholders are advocating for increased reporting on ESG
factors and consider ESG in investing decisions. 150

147

The United

See Miriam F. Weismann, The Missing Metrics of

Sustainability:

Just How Beneficial are Benefit Corporations?,

42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2017) (discussing the tension of
benefit corporations in advancing a “dual mission of wealth
maximization and corporate social responsibility).
148

See Pollman, supra note 10 (“[E]volving statutory law and

fiduciary duty jurisprudence have recognized that [fiduciary]
obligations cannot be eliminated because they preserve a safety
valve for protecting public policy, which springs from the same
source as corporate charters—the state”).
149

See Fink, supra note 1 (stating that climate risk is an

investment risk).
150

See Brewer, supra note 51 (discussing how investors have been

pushing for increased ESG disclosure to better inform
investment); Dawn Lim & Julie Steinberg, BlackRock to Hold
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Nations, the corporate elites at the World Economic Forum, and
institutional investors such as BlackRock have pushed for
consideration of ESG factors in investment and board level
decision-making.151

Some firms go as far as demanding action

from the SEC regarding increased reporting and disclosure on the
environment and other statistics for stockholders of publicly

Companies and Itself to Higher Standards on Climate Risk, WALL ST.
J. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrockshakes-up-sustainable-investing-business-following-criticism11579000873?shareToken=stba8857d997624910bc53df77e1dd78c3
(announcing that BlackRock would be taking a tougher stance on
corporations that do not disclose environmental risk and
discussing BlackRock and other institutional investors influence
upon markets);

Rick Wartzman and Kelly Tan,

The Business

Roundtable’s Model of Capitalism Does Pay Off, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-businessroundtables-model-of-capitalism-does-pay-off-11572228120
(evaluating how social responsibility and other stakeholder
considerations impact corporations).
151

See World Economic Forum, supra note 1; Brewer, supra note

51.
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traded companies.152

Consumers and employees, as well as

investors, are increasingly looking at the social impact of
organizations when considering patronage or employment
opportunities.153
By moving away from reliance on the “safety valve” of
regulation to protect employees, consumers, the community, and
the environment, directors can use oversight and monitoring
mechanisms to be more attentive to stakeholder interests, going
above the minimum requirements of regulatory compliance.154
Operationalizing efficient and accurate monitoring mechanisms
could prevent large commercial mishaps, as Boeing, Blue Bell,
Clovis Oncology, and Wells Fargo faced, and satisfy investor
demands of considering stakeholder impact.

152

See Brewer, supra note 68 (regarding the push from

institutional investors to include ESG in SEC mandated
disclosures).
153

Dieter Holder, What Generation Is Leading the Way in ESG

Investing?

You’ll Be Surprised, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10, 2019),

https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-generation-is-leading-the-wayin-esg-investing-youll-be-surprised-11568167440 (discussing how
Millennials and Gen X have a growing interest in ESG factors).
154

See Choudhary, supra note 72 (discussing the use of fiduciary

duties to advance social responsibility).
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D.

Oversight and Reporting in the Stakeholder Context

While other jurisdictions allow directors to consider
stakeholders through Constituency Statutes and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, there are few constraints on how directors
should balance between different stakeholder interests.155
Stockholders are the only stakeholders, except for creditors,
with any legal power to influence corporate decision, while
other stakeholders are not generally represented at the board
level, and do not have enumerated corporate rights.156

Because

stockholders control director elections and have the power and
means to pursue litigation, directors are incentivized to value
stockholder concerns.157

155

Therefore, even when corporations are

See Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework

for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV.
579, 589 (1992) (“As these and most other commentators See it,
constituency statutes threaten to undermine the balance of power
in corporations, granting “standardless discretion” to the board
and leading to poor decisions on behalf of the corporation”);
see also Orts, supra note 28 (discussing the permissive nature
of Constituency statutes).
156

See Strine, supra note 6.

157

See Mitchell, supra note 155 at 606 (discussing how directors

can protect themselves from litigation or replacement).
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legally permitted to consider the impact of a decision on
stakeholders, stockholders remain their top priority.158
Although there have been few derivative suits from
stockholders regarding the balancing of interests under
constituency statutes, stakeholders do not have a right of
action or a designated corporate power to advocate for their
interests.159

Stakeholders are left to “vote with their feet,”

through activism including protests and boycotts, and in drastic

158

See Mitchell, supra note 155 at 594 (discussing how directors

are beholden to stockholders through their agent-principal
relationship);

Gary von Strange, Corporate Social

Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:

Legend or Lie, 11

HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 461, 483 (1994) (“[T]hese statutes, as they
currently exist, do not force a corporation to conduct itself in
a socially responsible manner...Nor will these statutes
significantly transfer wealth from shareholder to [sic]
nonshareholder.”).
159

See Strine, supra note 6; see also Kentucky State Dist.

Council of Carpenters Pension Tr. Fund v. Myers, No. 4:10-CV00332, 2010 WL 11483954, at *1 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 9, 2010);
Georgia-Pacific Corp., v.

Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp.

31, 33 (D. Maine, 1989); Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 646 F.
Supp, 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
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situations, through individual suits which can jeopardize their
relationships with the corporation.160
In benefit corporations, directors must still fulfill
fiduciary duties to the stockholders and balance pecuniary
interest with the stated purpose of the corporation. 161

While

the benefit corporation structure provides directors more room
to consider the impact of business operations on each impacted
group, it does not provide the stakeholder-constituents a legal
route to enforcement or oversight, beyond annual reporting and
non-corporate mechanisms.162

Even in benefit corporations,

stockholders have the exclusive right to pursue derivative

160

See e.g., Josh Dzieza, “Beat the Machine”: Amazon Warehouse

Workers Strike to Protest Inhumane Conditions, THE VERGE, (Jul.
16, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/16/20696154/amazonprime-day-2019-strike-warehouse-workers-inhumane-conditions-therate-productivity; Sammy Nickalls, Here’s Why All Your Friends
Are Deleting Their Uber Accounts, ESQUIRE (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a52652/heres-whyuber/.
161

See Murray, supra note 40 (discussing the structure of

benefit corporation statutes).
162

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 362 (West 2015).
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litigation on behalf of the corporation.163

Nevertheless, the

requirement of an annual benefit report requires increased
reporting and monitoring of the benefit generated along with
risk management mechanisms.164

Benefit corporations, much like

regular corporations, only give stockholders the right to file
derivative suits against the corporation;

however, no suits

have been filed regarding the balancing of stakeholder and
stockholder interest.165
B Corps, certified by B Lab, are corporations that undergo
strict vetting and reevaluation to ensure that they maintain
sustainable policies.166

163

B Corps have the same regulatory

See Dalessandro, supra note 3 (discussing the rights of

stockholders in benefit corporations).
164

See Murray, supra note 51 (discussing the annual benefit

report requirement).
165

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 367 (West 2019) (“Stockholders of

a public benefit corporation owning individually or
collectively... as of the date of instituting such derivative
suit...may maintain a derivative lawsuit to enforce the
requirements set forth in § 365(a) of this title”.)
166

See B Labs, supra note 44 (describing the Benefit Impact

Assessment and verification process conducted by B Lab before
certification and every three years after).
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compliance duties as all corporations, but also have
requirements for transparency, with the added potential for a
site visits from B Labs.167

B Corps are required to consider

stakeholders, requiring B Corps to embody a legal corporate form
that allows such consideration, such as benefit corporations.168
Even when the stakeholder approach is implemented in the law,
corporations are required to assess risk (and benefits, in the
case of Benefit Corporations) and report them to stockholders.169
Benefit Corporations have built-in reporting systems, since
stakeholder considerations are mandated.170

167

See Certification Requirements, B Lab,

https://bcorporation.net/certification/meet-the-requirements
(describing that ten percent of certified corporations are
subject to site reviews every year).
168

See id.

(defining legal requirements for potential certified

corporations and providing a jurisdiction-based tool on which
types of corporations qualify).
169

See Lipton, supra note 112 (discussing risk disclosure to

investors, including ESG factors).
170

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 362 (West 2015) (mandating a

balance between stakeholder and shareholder interests); see also
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1715 (1983) (allowing corporations to
consider shareholder interests).
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Oversight, whether from outside monitoring, disclosure
requirements, or board functions would shed light on stakeholder
interests, in addition to emphasizing and enhancing corporate
compliance with regulations.171

The obligation of oversight is

entirely consistent with fiduciary duties and risk management
doctrines and serve a rational business purpose.172

Therefore,

considering stakeholders through the lens of risk and oversight
should satisfy corporate fiduciary duties, while satisfying the
stockholder in the long term.173
IV.

Risk Oversight and Board Level Engagement
To address the challenges some corporations face in meeting

the demands of some influential actors in the business
community, corporations should consider engaging with
stakeholders at the board level through representation and
oversight.174

171

At the same time, the government can mandate

See Pollman, supra note 10 at 2015 (“[T]he duty of good faith

remained a potential mechanism for accountability.”).
172

See id.

(discussing risk oversight and management).

173

See Lipton, supra note 112 (explaining the overlap of risk

management and oversight of stakeholder concerns).
174

See J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards,

54 AM. BUS. L. J. 61, 85 (2017) (discussing the increased
representation of stakeholders at the board level).
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specific stakeholder disclosure and encourage corporations to
consider stakeholder interests.175

As corporations adapt

corporate governance structures to encourage engagement with
stakeholders, they can proactively minimize risk and go beyond
their obligations of regulatory compliance.176
A. Proactive Boards and Corporate Oversight
While the adoption of a stakeholder approach leaves many
unanswered questions about the law and the future of corporate
governance, the paradigm shift in the business community will
require reform and robust corporate policies. 177

Apart from a

Revlon takeover situation or instances of gross negligence,
Delaware law is permissive regarding what a corporation can do,
so long as it satisfies a cognizable business interest. 178 While

175

Emily Barreca, Accountable Compensation, 37 YALE J. REG. 338,

370 (202) (discussing the Accountable Capitalism Act’s proposals
of mandating stakeholder considerations and increased
disclosure).
176

See Lipton, supra note 112 (discussing the importance of risk

oversight).
177

See Thompson, supra note 57 (calling for more information on

the implementation of the stakeholder approach).
178

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

8, § 101 (West 2020) (stating a

corporation can exist for any lawful business purpose).
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Delaware has yet to see robust derivative litigation about
stakeholder accountability, it seems that considering
stakeholders will be embraced as good faith efforts to advance a
business purpose.179

As corporations increasingly consider the

environment and employee conditions, supplier relations, and
other factors that touch on regulatory schemes, corporations
should implement robust oversight and reporting policies for
corporate compliance.180
i.

Extending Oversight and Risk Management to

Stakeholders
Every corporation, especially those in highly regulated
industries, should implement permanent oversight and
accountability committees that oversee both business risk and
legal compliance with positive law.181

179

Additionally,

See Huber, supra note 7 (discussing the application of the

business judgment rule to stakeholder considerations).
180

See Lipton, supra note 112 (discussing tips for corporations

on adopting oversight mechanisms such as

reviewing risk

tolerance and assessing whether the strategy is consistent with
the agreed-upon risk levels).
181

See Lewis Kamb, Boeing’s Board Calls for Better Internal

Safety Oversight in Wake Of 737 MAX Crashes, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept.
25, 2019) https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-
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corporations that chose not to opt into benefit corporation
structures should still implement annual reports beyond what is
usually required for an annual stockholders meeting or SEC
disclosure.182

Publicizing information such as ESG metrics will

aid corporations in enhancing their compliance culture.183
Emphasizing transparency from the “top” of the corporate
structure will also aid in establishing a corporate culture of
compliance.184
ii.

Board Level Representation

The existence of board level involvement in oversight will
allow for enhanced accountability from the top of the corporate
structure, and will work its way down to those directly

aerospace/boeings-board-calls-for-revamping-company-structurein-wake-of-737-max-crashes/ (stating that Boeing’s Board
recommended Aerospace Safety Committee after 737 Max Crashes).
182

See Brewer, supra note 51 (charting the gradual shift toward

incorporating ESG disclosures into SEC disclosures).
183

See Leo E. Strine, Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism,

PENN. L. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY, (Oct. 3, 2019), (recommending
“socially important companies” issue annual impact reports).
184

See Lipton, supra note 112 (suggesting that setting the “tone

from the top” should reflect company values and emphasize
integrity and escalation of non-compliance).
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responsible for identifying risk and ensuring compliance. 185
Additionally, stakeholders should be invited to the annual
stockholders meeting, and be provided a route to board level
representation, whether that takes the form of nonbinding
recommendations from stakeholders, or an actual path to election
to the board of directors.186

In Germany, companies have

employee-elected supervisory boards, which approve decisions of
the management boards and participate in the election of the
management board.187

The supervisory boards allow companies to

consider stakeholders, particularly employees, while having a
separate management body.188

185

See id. (arguing that an enhanced accountability structure

will aid corporations in being more socially responsible).
186

See An Update on Our Work to Serve All Stakeholders, AIRBNB

(Jan. 17, 2020) https://news.airbnb.com/serving-allstakeholders/ (announcing Stakeholder Day to report progress and
company updates)
187

See Murray, supra note 174 Adopting Stakeholder Advisory

Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 61, 85 (2017) (suggesting the
implementation of stakeholder advisory boards).
188

Id. (explaining the relationship between advisory boards and

directors).
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Corporations should also consider creating a stakeholder
advisory board that would be responsible for communicating with
the board of directors regarding “mission critical” or essential
operations of the corporation.189

The stakeholder advisory board

would include elected representatives’ subcommittees dedicated
to each stakeholder interest.190

For example, representatives of

employees, and those who work closely with the community,
suppliers, and consumers, would be able to meet and have input
on corporate activities.191
Although maximizing stock price is a compelling motivator
for boards, short term growth without consideration of the
stakeholder can lead to larger structural problems of a public
nature, such as widespread fraud at Wells Fargo and the Boeing
737 MAX crash.192

189

By increasing oversight and stakeholder input,

See Murray, supra note 174 at 94

(discussing the rationale

behind the stakeholder board movement).
190

See Strine, supra note 183 at 5 (recommending workforce

committees to address labor issues at the board level).
191

See Murray, supra note 174 at 98 (suggesting the ideal

composition of Stakeholder Advisory Board).
192

See Nocera, supra note 126 (theorizing that Boeing’s cost-

cutting strategies ultimately lead to its downfall).
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corporations can be proactive in avoiding public crises while
increasing long term growth and stakeholder satisfaction. 193
B.

Increasing the Standards for Socially Responsible

Corporations through Government Action
i.

Incentivizing sustainable business

Jurisdictions should work to encourage adopting

benefit

corporation status through incentives to corporations.194

The

City of Philadelphia provides a Sustainable Business Tax Credit
to “companies whose business practices support environmental and
human well-being.”195

Corporations that show certification from

B Lab, and submit evidence that the business conducts itself as
a sustainable business, giving “substantial consideration to
employee, community, and environmental interests in its

193

See Murray, supra note 174 at 106 (explaining stakeholder

advisory boards would achieve social enterprise aims).
194

See Anne Kim, The Rise of Do-Gooder Corporations, GOVERNING

(Jan. 2019), https://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/govphiladelphia-good-philanthropy-corporation.html (discussing the
benefits of the Philadelphia Tax credit).
195

Sustainable Business Tax Credit, CITY

OF

PHILADELPHIA,

https://www.phila.gov/services/payments-assistance-taxes/taxcredits/sustainable-business-tax-credit/ (last visited on Sep.
2, 2020).
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practices, products, and services” qualify for the tax credit. 196
Such incentives will aid mid-size and small corporations to make
the shift to benefit corporations and advance specified benefits
for their communities.197

The existence of benefit corporations

will increase the advancement of public good, and create more
pressure for other corporations to become socially
responsible.198
ii.

Increasing Disclosure and Reporting

Additionally, the SEC should move to require ESG metrics in
its required disclosures.199

Such disclosure would better inform

corporations and allow investors and consumers to apply pressure
to corporations to meet a higher standard when it comes to

196

Id. (limiting the number of businesses eligible to receive a

tax credit against their Philadelphia Business Income and
Receipts Tax Liability to seventy-five)
197

See Kim, supra note 194 (encouraging a shift to benefit

corporations to advance worker and community goals).
198

See Murray, supra note 40 (elaborating on the benefits of

Benefit Corporations as mechanisms to advance social
enterprise).
199

See Brewer, supra note 51 (discussing the SEC’s gradual shift

toward considering ESG factors in disclosures).
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factors such as carbon emissions.200

Additionally, increasing

transparency will allow corporations to better implement
oversight and reporting guidelines.201
iii. Stakeholder Commitments at the Federal Level
Progressive politicians have also been pushing for
increased accountability and stakeholder incorporation into
corporate governance.202

Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren

proposed the Accountable Capitalism Act that would codify the
stakeholder approach into law and mandate forty percent of
directors be elected by employees.203

Senator Warren’s plan to

require big corporations to charter at the federal level and
would require corporations to meet certain stakeholder
commitments.204

200

These potential requirements could fundamentally

See Lipton, supra note 112 (discussing the importance of ESG

metrics to institutional investors).
201

See id. (emphasizing the importance of risk oversight and

disclosure).
202

See Barreca, supra note 175 at 370 (discussing the

Accountable Capitalism Act).
203

See Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).

204

See id.
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change Delaware law to push corporations to be more proactive at
the federal level.205
V. Conclusion
The Business Roundtable’s Statement on the Purpose of a
Corporation is the culmination of a gradual paradigm shift
toward social responsibility and the stakeholder approach.206
Since the 1980s, corporate law has seen a shift toward
considering stakeholders that are impacted by corporations.207
While it is unlikely that Delaware law will change to shift to a
stakeholder approach, cases like Marchand v. Barnhill and Clovis
Oncology show some promise for increased standards for oversight
and legal compliance.208 Federal and local regulation and legal

205

See Barreca, supra note 175 at 375 (discussing the challenges

of the Accountable Capitalism Act).
206

Mireia Giné & Silvio Dulinsky, Business Leaders:

The Shift

to Stakeholder Capitalism Is Up to Us, World Economic Forum
(Jan. 9, 2020) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/shift-tostakeholder-capitalism-is-up-to-us/.
207

See Dalessandro, supra note 3 (detailing the proliferation of

constituency statutes and benefit corporations).
208

See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (noting

corporations should have board level oversight over essential
business functions and risks).
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compliance systems have long stood as a minimum protection for
stakeholders.209

The director role in oversight and

accountability prioritizes and ensures that stakeholders are
considered seriously by the board, especially when their
operations are identified as mission critical.210

Accordingly,

corporations should enhance the opportunity for stakeholder
representation and consideration at the board level, given many
corporations have identified stakeholders as “fundamental” to
operations.211

Whether corporations opt to become benefit

corporations, or create committees for employees, supplier
relations, consumers, the community, and the environment, they
can better facilitate stakeholder input at the board level.212

209

See Pollman, supra note 10 (referring to the “safety valve”

of public policy).
210

See Savitt, supra note 132 (referring to the requirement of

regulatory compliance, and recognizing red flags from
management).
211

See Strine, supra note 183 (recommending stakeholder

committees serve in an advisory position on the board of
directors).
212

Id. at 7; see Murray, supra note 174 (discussing stakeholder

advisory boards).
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Delaware corporations may be waiting a long time before the
legislature or courts implement the stakeholder approach into
law.

In the meantime, Corporate actors can pursue proactive

measures within their corporate structures to ensure that they
value stakeholders and consider them an opportunity for long
term growth.

Corporations should not wait until they face

public crises to consider interests affecting stakeholders but
should be proactive in cultivating growth through oversight and
a balance of interests at the board level. 213

213

See Barreca, supra note 175 at 374 (discussing the need for

stakeholder oriented boards that reallocate resources to serve
employees, communities and consumers).

61

